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First Amendment Rights for Publishers
and the Distribution of Unsolicited
Magazines to Inmates
Samantha Halpern*
I.

Introduction

When Ray Hrdlicka decided to begin a magazine that focuses on
distributing information about the criminal justice system, he asked
himself, “What was the best mechanism for the information and how
would it be delivered? The answer was obvious,” he said, “although not
so simple.”1 He wanted to produce a magazine that was delivered to the
people “who need it the most, when they need it the most, [and] where
they need it the most.”2 Thus, his target audience was jail inmates and
other people involved in the criminal justice system, including attorneys,
law enforcement officials, court personnel, and friends and family on
both sides of the law.
The first edition of Crime, Justice and America (“CJA”) came out in
May 2002 and by 2011, it was distributed in over seventy county jails
across thirteen states.3
CJA’s business model is fairly simple. It lures
advertisers—usually bail bondsmen and lawyers—with
the promise of a captive audience of thousands of
inmates in immediate need of their services[,] . . . then . .
. pressur[es] jail administrators to choose either leaving
stacks of CJA in common areas or allowing individual

* J.D., Pace Law School, 2013; B.A., The University of North Carolina at Chapel
Hill, 2010. The author wishes to thank her grandmother, Judge Rosalie B. Cooper, for
being a constant source of inspiration and guidance. She also thanks her family and
friends for their continuous support.
1. Distribution of Crime, Justice & America Magazine, CRIME, JUST. & AM. (Feb.
27,
2011)
[hereinafter
Distribution
of
Crime],
available
at
http://crimejusticeandamerica.com/distribution-of-crime-justice-america-magazine.
2. Id.
3. Id.
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be mailed directly to inmates off of an
Either way, every seven days enough
magazine] arrive at the targeted jails to
least one out of every ten inmates gets

While many jails allowed the direct distribution method,5 and some
even praised it, 6 the Sacramento County Jails and the Butte County Jails
refused to facilitate the direct distribution scheme and only allowed CJA
to be distributed to those inmates who requested it. 7 The jails claimed
that they refused to disseminate extra copies of the magazine to inmates
who did not ask for them in an effort to minimize the risk of smuggled
contraband and to reduce the amount of excess paper inmates could use
to do things such as start fires or clog toilets. 8 As a result, Hrdlicka filed
suit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claiming his First Amendment rights
were violated by the mail policies at the jails that refused to distribute
unsolicited copies to inmates.9
This Article discusses whether inmates have a First Amendment
interest in receiving unsolicited publications, and whether a publisher has
a First Amendment interest in distributing unsolicited publications. Part
II will discuss the history of prisoners’ First Amendment rights,
specifically in relation to publications and communications, and how the
standard for First Amendment violations of prisoner rights has evolved
over time. Part III will focus on the Supreme Court case Turner v.
Safley10 and how the test articulated in Turner applied to cases that
followed.11 Part IV will address whether the Turner standard was the
appropriate test to apply to whether publishers, and not inmates, have a
First Amendment interest in distributing unsolicited publications,

4. Hrdlicka v. Reniff, 656 F.3d 942, 944 (9th Cir. 2011), reh’g denied en banc, 631
F.3d 1044 (9th Cir. 2010).
5. This method involves leaving small stacks of the magazine in common areas of
the jail. Distribution of Crime, supra note 1.
6. Id. (“Fresno County jail . . . wrote an email praising the ‘direct distribution’
method.”).
7. See Hrdlicka, 631 F.3d at 1047-48.
8. Id. at 1051.
9. Id. at 1048.
10. 482 U.S. 78 (1987).
11. See Tanya Kessler, Purgatory Cannot Be Worse Than Hell: The First
Amendment Rights of Civilly Committed Sex Offenders, 12 N.Y. CITY L. REV. 283, 296
(2009).
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specifically in reference to the Ninth Circuit case Hrdlicka v. Reniff.12
The Supreme Court specifically stated that the Turner test was created
“to formulate a standard of review for prisoners’ constitutional claims . .
. .”13 In Hrdlicka, the publishers of CJA, and not the prisoners,
commenced the action, and thus the Turner test should not apply.
Furthermore, a substantial issue of material fact does not exist in
Hrdlicka, and the Ninth Circuit should have affirmed summary
judgment. The last section of Part IV will discuss the standard that
should have been applied in Hrdlicka.
II.

Standards Applied by the Court Regarding Prisoners’ First
Amendment Rights
Criminal convictions and lawful imprisonment
deprive citizens of their freedom and many other
constitutional rights, but prisoners do retain some
constitutional rights . . . . However, federal courts are
[often] reluctant to interfere with the internal
administration of prisons, and the judiciary accords
wide-ranging deference to the “expert judgment” of
prison officials. 14

The Supreme Court has stated that “prison administrators[,] . . . and
not the courts, [are] to make the difficult judgments concerning
institutional operations . . . .”15 Furthermore, “[p]rison management
decisions ‘are peculiarly within the province and professional expertise
of corrections officials, and, in the absence of substantial evidence in the
record to indicate that the officials have exaggerated their response to
these considerations, courts should ordinarily defer to their expert
judgment in such matters.’”16

12. 631 F.3d 1044.
13. Turner, 482 U.S. at 85.
14. Substantive Rights Retained By Prisoners, 36 GEO. L.J. ANN. REV. CRIM. PROC.
948, 947 (2007) (footnotes omitted).
15. Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners’ Labor Union, Inc., 433 U.S. 119, 128 (1977).
16. Aaron H. Caplan, Freedom of Speech in School and Prison, 85 WASH. L. REV.
71, 89 (2010) (quoting Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 827 (1974)).

3
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Courts’ approaches to prisoners’ constitutional rights can be
classified into three phases.17 Beginning in the 1930s, federal courts
mainly adhered to the “hands-off” doctrine, “refusing to protect prisoners
from constitutional violations, partly on the basis of federalism.” 18 Lower
federal courts supported the hands-off doctrine due to “judges’ lack of
familiarity with prison life and . . . time consuming, frivolous . . . filings
[that] clog[ged] the court.”19 “Between 1967 and 1977[,] the federal
judiciary underwent a [dramatic] transformation” wherein it “abandoned
the hands-off doctrine” and greatly expanded constitutional protections
to many aspects of incarceration, including First Amendment rights and
living conditions.20 Under Procunier v. Martinez,21 the standard for First
Amendment violations of prisoner rights was that the regulation in
question had to “further an important or substantial governmental interest
unrelated to the suppression of expression,” and the limitation could be
“no greater than is necessary” to protect the interest involved. 22 This
decision, however, was short lived.
The shift from the protective stance toward prisoners in Martinez to
more judicial deference to prison administrators was evident in Pell v.
Procunier.23 The Court held that a prison regulation that did not allow
media representatives to interview particular inmates and did not allow
prisoners to initiate interviews did not unconstitutionally infringe on
prisoners’ First Amendment rights, and the regulation did not amount to
unconstitutional state interference with free press.24 The Court noted that
“[a]lthough they would not permit prison officials to prohibit all
expression or communication by prison inmates, security considerations
are sufficiently paramount in the administration of the prison . . . .”25
Thus, the judiciary began to provide prison administrators with more
leeway in the way they ran the prisons.
Through the 1970s, the judiciary continually applied extreme
deferential prison standards toward prisoners’ constitutional rights,
particularly their First Amendment rights. In the 1977 case Jones v.
17. Kessler, supra note 11, at 295.
18. Id. (citing James E. Robertson, The Rehnquist Court and the “Turnerization” of
Prisoners’ Rights, 10 N.Y. CITY L. REV. 97, 99 (2006)).
19. Robertson, supra note 18.
20. Id. at 100.
21. 416 U.S. 396 (1974).
22. Id. at 413. This standard was similar to strict scrutiny.
23. 417 U.S. 817 (1974).
24. See id. at 834.
25. Id. at 827.
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North Carolina Prisoners’ Labor Union, Inc., the Court noted that “First
Amendment associational rights . . . must give way to the reasonable
considerations of penal management.”26 Two years later, the Court held
that “a prohibition against receipt of hardback books unless mailed
directly from publishers, book clubs, or bookstores does not violate the
First Amendment rights of . . . inmates.”27 The restriction, the Court said,
was a response to an obvious security problem—smuggling contraband,
such as money, drugs, and weapons, in the bindings of hardcover
books.28 The Court cemented this shift away from the high-level scrutiny
courts previously applied to infringements on prisoners’ constitutional
rights with the 1987 Turner v. Safely29 decision, which established
extreme judicial deference to prison administrators for prisoners’ First
Amendment rights.30
As evident from subsequent cases, the Court has moved to a more
deferential standard when assessing prisoners’ rights. With regard to
First Amendment rights, specifically the distribution of mail and books
in prison, the Court is particularly concerned with safety issues. As such,
over time, the Court has increasingly deferred to prison administrators to
regulate and manage prisoners’ First Amendment rights.
III. Turner v. Safley31
Turner remains one of the most influential prisoners’ rights cases.
The district court swayed from the standard set forth in Wolfish and
“employed heightened scrutiny in finding unconstitutional prison
regulations largely forbidding correspondence between inmates and
barring inmate marriages.”32 The district court deemed inmate
correspondence and marriage as fundamental rights33 and “barred
26. Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners’ Labor Union, Inc., 433 U.S. 119, 132 (1977).
In Jones, where a prison inmates “labor union” brought suit challenging a prison
regulation that prohibited delivery of packets of union publications mailed in bulk to
prisoners for redistribution among other prisoners, the Court held that the possible
detrimental effects of organizational activities of the union were sufficiently weighty to
prevail against the prisoners’ First Amendment rights. Id.
27. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 550 (1979).
28. Id. at 551.
29. 482 U.S. 78 (1987).
30. See Kessler, supra note 11, at 295.
31. 482 U.S. 78.
32. Robertson, supra note 18, at 103 (citing Turner, 482 U.S. at 82-83).
33. Turner v. Safley, 586 F. Supp. 589, 594-96 (W.D. Mo. 1984); Robertson, supra
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limitations on their exercise unless they constituted the least-restrictive
method to achieving penal goals.” 34 The court of appeals used the same
test and affirmed. 35 Writing for the majority when the case reached the
Supreme Court, Justice O’Connor stated, “a lesser standard of scrutiny is
appropriate in determining the constitutionality of the prison rules[,]” 36
and thus rejected the strict scrutiny analysis applied by the lower courts.
In place of heightened scrutiny, the Turner Court advanced a
reasonableness standard.37 Thus, “when a prison regulation impinges on
inmates’ constitutional rights, the regulation is valid [only] if it is
reasonably related to legitimate penological interests.”38 To determine
whether a regulation is reasonable, the court in Turner articulated a fourfactor test: first, whether the regulation is rationally related to a
legitimate and neutral governmental objective; 39 second, whether there
are alternative avenues that remain open to exercise the right; 40 third,
“the impact [that] accommodati[ng] . . . the asserted . . . right will have
on guards and other inmates, and on the allocation of prison resources; 41
and fourth, whether the existence of easy and obvious alternatives
indicates that the regulation is an exaggerated response by prison
officials. 42 The Court applied each of these factors to the two regulations
and found that the prohibition on inmate-to-inmate mail was
constitutional, as the regulation limited the potential to form escape plans
and promote gang communication.43 Furthermore, the regulation passed
the four factors articulated by the test, and the regulation did not
unconstitutionally restrict inmates’ First Amendment rights. 44

note 18, at 103 (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937) (“[T]he very
essence of a scheme of ordered liberty.”).
34. Robertson, supra note 18, at 104 (citing Turner, 586 F. Supp. at 594, 596).
35. Safley v. Turner, 777 F.2d 1307, 1316 (8th Cir. 1985).
36. Turner, 482 U.S. at 81.
37. Id. at 89.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 90.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. See id. at 91.
44. See id. at 91-93.
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Analysis of Turner Factors

The test in Turner is clearly deferential toward prison
administrators’ regulations. The Supreme Court, however, did not
provide sufficient guidance as to how the Turner test should be applied. 45
The first factor states that there must be a “‘rational connection’ between
the prison regulation and the legitimate governmental interest put
forward to justify it.”46 The “governmental objective must be a legitimate
and neutral one[,]”47 which is a relatively “easy factor for prison officials
to meet.”48 “The government’s interests in rehabilitating prisoners, prison
security, [fire safety,] and even budgetary concerns” are a number of
ways in which the government could satisfy this standard.49 As such, the
first factor in the Turner test is generally easy for the government to
satisfy.
The second factor of the Turner test states: “[w]here ‘other avenues’
remain available for the exercise of the asserted right . . . courts should
be particularly conscious of the ‘measure of judicial deference owed to
corrections officials . . . in gauging the validity of the regulation.’” 50 This
prong, however, is vague, as it seems that “[a] court need not seek an
alternative to the specific right, but may seek an alternative to the general
right.”51 “Thus, a court may defer to prison administrators even where no
alternative to the specific right exists.” 52 Therefore, it appears there is
some leeway in satisfying this factor of the test.
The third factor of the test focuses on “the impact accommodation
of the asserted constitutional right will have on guards and other
inmates.”53 In addition, it also looks at the impact the asserted right will
have on the allocation of resources in the prison. 54 “When

45. Melissa Rivero, Melting in the Hands of the Court: M&M’s, Art, and a
Prisoner’s Right to Freedom of Expression, 73 BROOK. L. REV. 811, 828 (2008). See
generally 1 MICHAEL B. MUSHLIN, RIGHTS OF PRISONERS § 5:2, at 595-99 (3d ed. 2002)
(providing additional information on the Turner case).
46. Turner, 482 U.S. at 89 (quoting Block v. Rutherford, 468 U.S. 576, 586
(1984)).
47. Id. at 90.
48. Rivero, supra note 45, at 828.
49. Id.
50. Turner, 482 U.S. at 90 (quoting Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 827 (1974)).
51. Rivero, supra note 45, at 828-29.
52. Id. at 829.
53. Turner, 482 U.S. at 90.
54. Id.

7

HALPERN Macro Final

802

7/26/2013 4:49 PM

PACE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 33:2

accommodation of an asserted right will have a significant ‘ripple effect,’
. . . courts . . . [are advised to] be particularly deferential to the informed
discretion of corrections officials.”55 Despite the similarity in the
reasonableness analysis between the first and third factors, the third
prong focuses on the regulation’s reasonableness with regard to “the
plaintiff’s proposed alternative for operating the prison.”56
Lastly, the fourth factor considers whether the prison regulation is
unreasonable and “an ‘exaggerated response’ to prison concerns.” 57 “The
plaintiff bears the burden of suggesting an alternative[;]” 58 the
alternative, however, need not be the least restrictive avenue. 59 “An
inmate must show that an obvious, easy alternative exists and th[us], . . .
the regulation is an overreaction to prison administrators’ concern.” 60
Moreover, if the proposed alternative is likely to create a “ripple effect”
and thus, creates negative repercussions in other areas of prison
administration, then the alternative is unlikely to withstand judicial
scrutiny.61 With the introduction of the Turner test, courts became more
deferential to prison administrators. The prongs of the test were
somewhat vague, but future cases provided some interpretation of the
four-prong test. Nonetheless, it was clear the court was shifting toward a
more lenient approach as to how jail administrators regulated their
prisons.
B.

Turner Test Applied to Distribution of Literature

“[M]embers of the Turner majority envisaged a test governing all
rights implicated by prison regulations.” 62 Quickly following the Turner
ruling, “the Court applied the . . . test to prison regulations addressing
two other aspects of the First Amendment:” 63 religious practices64 and
receipt of books.65 The Court in Thornburgh v. Abbott66 reviewed the
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.

Id.
Rivero, supra note 45, at 829 (citing MUSHLIN, supra note 45, at 36).
Turner, 482 U.S. at 90.
Rivero, supra note 45, at 829 (citing Turner, 482 U.S. at 90-91).
See Turner, 482 U.S. at 90-91.
Rivero, supra note 45, at 829 (citing Turner, 482 U.S. at 90-91).
Id. (citing MUSHLIN, supra note 45, at 35-36).
Robertson, supra note 18, at 105.
Id.
O’Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342 (1987); Robertson, supra note 18, at

105.
65. Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401 (1989); Robertson, supra note 18, at 105.
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Federal Bureau of Prisons regulations that governed the censorship of
publications sent to inmates; inmates can generally receive materials, but
the warden may reject material according to specific criteria.67 Using the
reasonableness standard from Turner, the Court in Abbott held that
wardens may reject publications sent to inmates if they are deemed
“detrimental to the security, good order, or discipline of the institution or
if it might facilitate criminal activity.” 68 The difference between the
Turner and Abbott cases is that in Turner the inmate correspondence
regulation implicated only the rights of prisoners and did not affect nonprisoners. In Abbott, however, the regulation implicated the rights of
nonprisoners, specifically publishers who wished to communicate with
inmates. Thus, although the Turner test was not immediately applied to
prisoners’ rights, it provided a standard to address prisoners’ religious
practices and the receipt of books.
C.

The Ninth Circuit

Federal courts have repeatedly applied the Turner test to prisoners’
First Amendment rights. The Ninth Circuit, in particular, “ha[s] applied
the Turner test [to] four cases involving the distribution of literature to
inmates.”69 In each case, the Ninth Circuit held that “prison policies[,
which] placed restrictions on the distribution of gift and solicited
publications[,]” were unconstitutional. 70 In Crofton v. Roe,71 the Ninth
Circuit “struck down a regulation that prohibited a prisoner from
receiving a book that [was] ordered for him by his stepfather.”72 The
Court stated that the state failed to offer any justification for a blanket
ban on the receipt of all gift publications. 73 A few years later, the Ninth
Circuit struck down a ban on bulk-rate mail as applied to non-profit
publications.74 The court noted that “the receipt of such unobjectionable
mail [does not] implicate penological interests.”75 In Morrison v. Hall,76
66. 490 U.S. 401.
67. See Stacey A. Miness, Pornography Behind Bars, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 1702,
1714-15 (2000) (quoting Abbott, 490 U.S. at 403).
68. Abbott, 490 US at 404.
69. Hrdlicka v. Reniff, 631 F.3d 1044, 1050 (9th Cir. 2011).
70. Id.
71. 170 F.3d 957, 960 (9th Cir. 1999).
72. Hrdlicka, 631 F.3d at 1050 (citing Crofton, 170 F.3d at 960-61).
73. Crofton, 170 F.3d at 960.
74. See Prison Legal News v. Cook, 238 F.3d 1145, 1151 (9th Cir. 2001).
75. Hrdlicka, 631 F.3d at 1050 (quoting Prison Legal News, 238 F.3d at 1149).
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the Ninth Circuit struck down a regulation applied to “pre-paid, forprofit, subscription publications,” and noted that the government did not
provide any evidence regarding how the impact of processing the
publications would impact prison resources. 77 Lastly, the Ninth Circuit
cut down a prison ban on “non-subscription bulk mail” in the 2005 case
Prison Legal News v. Lehman.78 As evident from precedent, the Ninth
Circuit has continuously applied the Turner test to prisoners’ rights, and
in doing so, has expanded prisoners’ First Amendment rights,
particularly regarding the distribution of publications.
IV. Hrdlicka v. Reniff79
The Ninth Circuit notoriously interferes with the administration of
prisons.80 Thus, it did not come as a surprise when the Ninth Circuit held
that county jail prisoners have the right to receive unsolicited copies of
CJA.81 The quarterly magazine informs, explains, entertains, interprets,
uncovers, and questions relevant issues in the criminal justice system,
and between 2002 and 2011, fourteen editions of the magazine were
published, totaling over one million copies.82 When Sacramento County
and Butte County sheriffs refused to distribute the magazine at their
county jails,83 Ray Hrdlicka, the publisher of CJA, and CJA filed federal
lawsuits against them. 84 The sheriffs countered that an increase in the
number of publications and papers in their jails led to security
concerns.85

76. 261 F.3d 896 (9th Cir. 2001).
77. Id. at 898.
78. 397 F.3d 692 (9th Cir. 2005) (involving publications that inmates requested but
for which they do not pay).
79. 631 F.3d 1044.
80. See Hrdlicka v. Reniff, 656 F.3d 942 (9th Cir. 2011), 9TH CIR. WATCH (Oct. 13,
2011, 8:22 PM), http://blog.the9thcircuitwatch.com/search?q=hrdlicka [hereinafter 9TH
CIRCUIT WATCH].
81. Hrdlicka, 631 F.3d at 1055.
82. See id. at 1046-47.
83. Id. at 1048. Both jails had policies that limited the amount of written materials
inmates can keep in their cells. Id. at 1047-48. In Sacramento jails, an inmate may keep
up to one newspaper, five periodicals, and five soft-covered books in his cell at any given
time. Id. at 1047.
84. Id. at 1046.
85. Id. at 1051-52.
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Prison officials from the two counties filed summary judgment
motions.86 The district court granted summary judgment to both Sheriff
McGuiness and Sheriff Reniff under the Turner test.87 Hrdlicka timely
appealed and the court of appeals reviewed the order de novo. 88 Viewing
the evidence in the light most favorable to Hrdlicka and CJA, a divided
three-judge panel of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the
order for summary judgment and held “publishers and inmates have a
First Amendment interest in communicating with each other.” 89
Furthermore, the majority held that “[a] First Amendment interest in
distributing and receiving information does not depend on a recipient’s
prior request for that information.” 90 The majority applied the Turner test
and found the jails’ response to the distribution of the unsolicited
magazine may have been exaggerated.91 When “[a] judge of the court
called for a vote on the petitions for rehearing en banc[,] . . . [a single]
question [was] presented . . . : Does the four-factor test of Turner . . .
apply to distribution of a magazine to county jail inmates who have not
requested it?”92 “A vote was taken, and a majority of the active judges of
the court failed to vote for en banc rehearing[;]” 93 however, eight judges
dissented.94 Concurring in the denial of rehearing en banc, Justices
Reinhardt and Fletcher stressed that just because “the publication was
unsolicited does not make the Turner test inapplicable.”95 In fact, the
Justices noted that the Ninth Circuit previously “applied Turner to
evaluate a regulation banning [the] distribution of requested but ‘nonsubscription bulk mail.’”96 As such, the denial of an en banc hearing
meant summary judgment was reversed.

86. Id. at 1047.
87. Id. at 1047-48.
88. Id. at 1048.
89. Id. at 1049.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 1054-55.
92. Hrdlicka v. Reniff, 656 F.3d 942, 942-43 (9th Cir. 2011), reh’g denied en banc,
631 F.3d 1044.
93. Id.
94. See id. at 943.
95. Id.
96. Id. (citing Prison Legal News v. Lehman, 397 F.3d 692 (9th Cir. 2005)).
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Majority

The majority in Hrdlicka v. Reniff97 repeatedly emphasized that the
Turner test was the proper standard by which to assess whether the
prisoners’ constitutional rights were violated. 98 The majority held that
neither defendant was entitled to summary judgment, and thus reversed
the district courts’ orders granting summary judgment. 99 In reaching their
decision, the majority first analyzed whether any First Amendment
interest was implicated. 100 After concluding First Amendment interests
were present, it applied the four-factor Turner test to determine whether
the jails’ policies violated the prisoners’ First Amendment rights. 101 The
court determined that the defendants did not justify banning the
unsolicited distribution of CJA to county jail inmates.102
1. First Amendment Interest
The first step in the majority’s analysis was to determine whether
any First Amendment right was implicated. 103 If such rights were
implicated, the court would then apply the four-factor Turner test. The
court in Thornburgh v. Abbott104 applied the same two-step analysis and
held that with regard to First Amendment rights, “publishers who wish to
communicate with those who, through subscription, willingly seek their
point of view have a legitimate First Amendment interest in access to
prisoners.”105 The majority in Hrdlicka noted that the Ninth Circuit has
“repeatedly recognized that publishers and inmates have a First
Amendment interest in communicating with each other.”106 Furthermore,
the majority stated that “[a] First Amendment interest in distributing and
receiving information does not depend on a recipient’s prior request for
that information”107 and pointed to the holding in Martin v. City of
97. 631 F.3d 1044 (9th Cir. 2011).
98. See id. at 1051-55.
99. Id. at 1055.
100. Id. at 1048.
101. See id. at 1049-56.
102. Id. at 1055.
103. Id. at 1048.
104. 490 U.S. 401 (1989).
105. Id. at 408.
106. Hrdlicka, 631 F.3d at 1049; see, e.g., Prison Legal News v. Lehman, 397 F.3d
692, 699 (9th Cir. 2005); accord Thornburgh, 490 U.S. at 408.
107. Hrdlicka, 631 F.3d at 1049.
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Struthers,108 which held that “a municipal ordinance that made it
unlawful to go door to door distributing handbills, circulars, or
advertisements” was unconstitutional.109 Thus, the majority in Hrdlicka
found that “publisher[s] ha[ve] a First Amendment interest in
distributing[] and inmates have a First Amendment interest in receiving[]
unsolicited publications” of CJA.110
2. Turner Application
Following the determination that both inmates and publishers have
First Amendment interests in the distribution and collection of CJA, the
majority applied the four-step Turner test to evaluate the reasonableness
of the prison regulation and decide whether it violated constitutional
rights.111 The majority maintains that the Supreme Court and Ninth
Circuit “have consistently applied the Turner test to determine whether
various forms of written communication with inmates are protected by
the First Amendment.”112 The Turner test has been applied to “individual
challenges to prison or jail regulations forbidding various forms of
written communications[,]”113 and the majority found that “the fact that
the publication [in Hrdlicka] was unsolicited does not make the Turner
test inapplicable.”114 Thus, the majority held that the Turner test was the
proper standard by which to evaluate whether First Amendment rights
were violated.
The first step of the Turner test is to determine whether the prison
regulation is rationally related to a legitimate penological objective. 115
Should “the prison fail[] to show . . . the regulation is rationally related to
a legitimate penological objective, [the court] do[es] not consider the
other factors[;]”116 however, if the regulation is rationally related, the
court assesses the three other prongs. 117 Officers at the Sacramento and
Butte County Jails asserted various reasons for the prison regulations: jail

108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.

319 U.S. 141, 143 (1943).
Hrdlicka, 631 F.3d at 1049 (citing Martin, 319 U.S. at 143).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1050.
Id. at 1051.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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security, staff resources, slippery slope, and interference with existing
advertising.118
Officers at the jails were concerned with the effect an influx of
publications would have on jail security. 119 By refusing to allow
unsolicited copies of CJA, the officers maintained it would “reduc[e] the
likelihood of contraband entering the jail, . . . reduc[e] the risk of fires[,]
and enable[e] efficient cell searches.” 120 Furthermore, they also asserted
that the policies promoted security because unsolicited publications were
more likely to be used for “‘nefarious purposes’ such as blocking lights
or clogging toilets.”121 Thus, the officers argued the policies were
reasonable to protect the security interests of inmates and general
regulation within the jail.
The majority was unconvinced that by permitting unsolicited copies
of CJA, there would be heightened security concerns at the jail. 122 The
Sacramento County jail previously received unsolicited copies of the
Sacramento Bee and USA Today but halted delivery of both publications
for reasons other than security concerns.123 Furthermore, “Lieutenant
Bryan Flicker of the Butte County jail stated in his declaration that
inmates at th[e] jail already have access to paper that they use for
improper purposes[,]”124 and he failed to point out how and “whether
distribution of CJA was likely to increase the rate of such use of paper by
inmates.”125 As such, the majority concluded that the jails failed to
establish whether distribution of CJA in the jails “would produce
additional clutter in inmates [sic] cells or otherwise adversely affect jail
security.”126
Jail officers gave other reasons to justify their policies. First,
officers expressed concern that by allowing delivery of unsolicited
copies of CJA, additional staff and time would be required to sort
through the mail publications. 127 Officer Fox of the Sacramento County
Jail stated “[a] total of twenty-four . . . personnel hours are used per day

118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.

Id. at 1051-53.
Id. at 1051.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See id.
Id. at 1052.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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on mail related duties at the [j]ail.” 128 The majority found, however, that
“[n]either jail . . . suggested that unsolicited publications are more
difficult to inspect and deliver than solicited publications[,]” 129 and each
failed to show how many additional hours would be required if
unsolicited copies of CJA were delivered. 130 Thus, the majority was
unconvinced with this argument.
The next argument the officers presented to prove the regulations
were rationally related to a legitimate penological objective was that
should the jails accept unsolicited publications of CJA, there would be an
influx of other unsolicited publications. 131 Furthermore, the Butte County
Jail, in particular, wanted to “maintain control over advertising of bail in
the jail” and distributing unsolicited copies of CJA would be inconsistent
with existing advertising contracts.132 The majority, however, was
unimpressed with both arguments. As per the slippery slope, the majority
stated that the jail “did not present any evidence about other requests to
distribute unsolicited mail.”133 Additionally, as per interference with
existing advertising, the majority held that a jail does not have “a
legitimate penological interest . . . in protecting a profit made by
impinging on inmates’ First Amendment rights.” 134 Since the prisons did
not fail to show the regulation are not rationally related to legitimate
penological factors, the majority assessed the remaining three factors in
the Turner test.135
The second element of the Turner test is whether there are other
avenues available to exercise the asserted right. 136 The “[d]efendants
argue that CJA has alternative avenues to communicate with inmates
because the jails will distribute CJA to inmates who request it.”137 The
majority conceded, however, that there is a question of fact as to whether
CJA publishers can effectively reach inmates if they can only reach them

128. Id.
129. Id. at 1053.
130. Id. at 1052-53.
131. Id. at 1053.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id. (“Butte County jail has a contract with Partners for a Safer America, Inc.
(‘PSA’), under which PSA operates bulletin boards in the jail on which bail bond agents
are allowed to post advertisements. PSA pays the jail a percentage of its profits from its
sale of advertising space on the bulletin boards.”).
135. Id. at 1053-55.
136. Id. (quoting Turner v. Safely, 482 U.S. 78, 90 (1987)).
137. Id. at 1053-54.
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upon request.138 In addition, although inmates have access to the yellow
pages and television, many inmates leave the jail before they learn that
CJA exists, have time to request it, and then ultimately receive it. 139
Thus, the majority concluded there is a material issue of fact as to
whether there are other avenues available. 140
The third element of the Turner test is the “impact accommodation
of the asserted constitutional right will have on guards and other inmates,
and on the allocation of prison resources generally.” 141 “When
accommodation of an asserted right will have a significant ‘ripple effect’
on fellow inmates or on prison staff, courts should be particularly
deferential to the informed discretion of corrections officials.” 142
Plaintiffs stated they are willing to work with the jail officials to make
the distributions easy and efficient, but there are issues as to the degree to
which the jails would need to expend additional resources to
accommodate the publishers. Officers, however, did not explain how
mail inspectors would distinguish between unsolicited and requested
copies of CJA, and thus, a ban on unsolicited copies could actually
consume more prison resources than otherwise. 143 Therefore, a question
of material fact exists to the impact of accommodating the right to
distribute the unsolicited copies of CJA.
The fourth and final element of the Turner test is
whether the existence of easy and obvious alternatives
indicates that the regulation is an exaggerated response
by prison officials. This is not a “least restrictive
alternative” test: prison officials do not have to set up
and then shoot down every conceivable alternative
method of accommodating the claimant’s constitutional
complaint. “[A]n alternative that fully accommodates the
[asserted] rights at de minimis cost to valid penological
interests suggests that the regulation does not satisfy the
reasonable relationship standard.”144

138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.

Id. at 1054.
Id.
Id. at 1053-54.
Id. at 1054 (quoting Turner, 482 U.S. at 90).
Id. (quoting Turner, 482 U.S. at 90).
Id.
Id. at 1054-55 (citations omitted).
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“The undisputed fact that CJA is . . . distributed in more than [sixty]
counties throughout [thirteen] states . . . suggests that the [jails’]
responses . . . may be exaggerated.” 145 Furthermore, the jail has not
pointed to any procedures by which they can mitigate the drain on jail
resources.146 Thus, taking all four Turner factors into consideration with
the fact that First Amendment interests are implicated in the case, the
majority held that neither defendant is entitled to summary judgment. 147
B.

Dissent

The dissent in Hrdlicka found that there is not an issue of material
fact and would uphold the district court’s order granting summary
judgment to the defendants.148 The dissent focuses on one important
aspect: there have been no prisoner requests for access to CJA. 149 The
dissent concedes that the Ninth Circuit has found that the First
Amendment guarantees Hrdlicka access to prisoners who have requested
the magazine, but none have requested it.150 Furthermore, the dissent
argues that “there is no precedent suggesting that the First Amendment
guarantees Hrdlicka the special right to sue any sheriff[, jail, or officer]
who refuses to be a de facto distribut[or] . . . of the CJA.”151
“Prisons are not public fora.”152 Instead, the court points out, prisons
are one of the few “public institutions which do not perform speechrelated functions at all . . . [where] the government is free to exclude
even peaceful speech and assembly which interferes in any way with the
functioning of those organizations.” 153 Prisons are built for security
purposes and to punish and deter criminal activity. 154 Since prisons are
not public fora, and speech can be suppressed in certain instances, the
dissent argues that prisons should be able to restrict the distribution of
unsolicited copies of CJA.

145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.

Id. at 1055.
See id.
Id.
See id. at 1055-58 (Smith, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1055-56.
Id.
Id. at 1056.
Id. (citing United States v. Douglass, 579 F.2d 545, 549 (9th Cir. 1978)).
Id.
Id.
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The dissent states that “[t]he majority’s [proposition] that ‘Turner
addresses’ any ‘concerns’ regarding the difference between public fora
and prisons[] is unavailing.”155 The Supreme Court in Turner stated that
the Court’s task was to “formulate a standard of review for prisoners’
constitutional claims . . . .”156 The dissent argues that since the publishers
are the aggrieved party, and no prisoner has brought a claim alleging his
or her constitutional rights have been violated, there are no First
Amendment rights implicated. 157 As such, since there are no prisoners’
constitutional claims, the Turner test should not be applied.158
Lastly, the dissent argues that the media has “no constitutional right
of access to prisons or their inmates beyond that afforded the general
public.”159 “Just as the press has no [constitutional] right of access to
prison[ers,]” publishers distributing their magazines to inmates do not
have a constitutional right of access. 160 “Hrdlicka has no special right to
demand a sheriff accept one of his chosen methods of distribution,
especially given that a prison is not a public forum.” 161 Hrdlicka can use
other avenues to distribute and advertise his magazine and inform
inmates about his publication. 162 Thus, prisons should be able to restrict
the distribution of unsolicited copies of CJA, and summary judgment
awarded to the defendants should be affirmed. 163
C.

Improper Outcome and Turner Application

The Ninth Circuit has continuously interfered with the
administration of prisons.164 As such, “The Supreme Court has
repeatedly reversed [Nin]th Circuit expansion of prison inmates
substantive rights beyond their scope . . . .”165 In Hrdlicka v. Reniff, the
Ninth Circuit continued its trend in interfering with the administration of
prisons and held that the prisons did not justify banning the unsolicited

155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.

Id. (citations omitted).
Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 85 (1987)).
Id.
See id. at 1057.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See id.
Id. at 1058.
9TH CIRCUIT WATCH, supra note 80.
Id.
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copies of CJA to county jail members. 166 Furthermore, it held prisoners
have a right to receive such unsolicited copies, and Hrdlicka, the
publisher, has a right to send them. 167 The Ninth Circuit, however,
applied the Turner test, which was the incorrect standard. Not only does
the holding from the Turner Court specifically apply to prisoners’
constitutional claims, and not publishers claims, but it is also material
that prisons are not public fora.168 In addition, the Supreme Court has
continually deferred prison administration issues to the prisons, 169 and
the press does not have a constitutional right of access to prisons and
prison inmates.170 As such, summary judgment in favor of the prisons
should not have been reversed, and the Turner test should not have been
applied.
1. Turner Test Is Incorrect Standard
The Turner test is the incorrect standard to apply as to whether
Hrdlicka has a right to distribute non-solicited copies of CJA to inmates.
In Turner, a class action was brought by “persons who either are or may
be confined to the Renz Correctional Center and who desire to
correspond with inmates at other Missouri correctional facilities.” 171
Furthermore, the Court in Turner specifically stated that their task was to
“formulate a standard of review for prisoners’ constitutional claims that
is responsive both to the ‘policy of judicial restraint regarding prisoner
complaints and [to] the need to protect constitutional rights.’”172 As such,
the Turner Court held that regulations within the jail relating to inmate
marriages were unconstitutional, while regulations regarding inmate-toinmate correspondence were constitutional since they related to
legitimate security concerns.173 Most importantly, however, is that fact

166. Hrdlicka, 631 F.3d at 1046.
167. Id. at 1049.
168. Id. at 1056 (Smith, J., dissenting) (citing United States v. Douglass, 579 F.2d
545, 549 (9th Cir. 1978)).
169. Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners’ Labor Union, Inc., 433 U.S. 119, 128
(1977) (“[P]rison administrators[,] . . . and not the courts, [are] to make the difficult
judgments concerning institutional operations . . . .”).
170. Hrdlicka, 631 F.3d at 1057 (Smith J., dissenting) (citing Pell v. Procunier, 417
U.S. 817 (1974)).
171. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 82 (1987).
172. Id. at 85 (alteration in original) (emphasis added) (quoting Procunier v.
Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 406 (1987)).
173. Id. at 99.
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that the holding referred to prisons’ constitutional claims and judicial
restraint concerning prisoners’ complaints.
In Hrdlicka, Ray Hrdlicka, the publisher of CJA, brought claims
asserting he and the publication have a First Amendment right to
distribute unsolicited copies of CJA to prison inmates. 174 Hrlicka is not a
prison inmate. CJA is also not a prison inmate. No prison inmates
brought claims asserting their First Amendment rights were violated
when the prisons refused to distribute unsolicited copies of CJA. As
such, it is evident that Turner is not the proper test to apply since the
issue and holding in Turner pertained solely to prisoners’ constitututional
claims and complaints. Since there are no prisoner constitutional claims
at issue in Hrdlicka, the Ninth Circuit should not have applied the fourstep Turner test.
2. Prisons Are Not Public Fora
Prisons are not public fora.175 A public forum is an area where the
government cannot regulate speech-related conduct except in narrow,
non-discriminatory ways shown to be essential in serving significant
governmental interests.176 At one end of the spectrum and most protected
from any form of regulation are areas such as public streets and parks. 177
At the other and least shielded from regulation, however, are places such
as hospitals, military bases, and prisons. In such places as those least
shielded from regulation, the government is free to exclude even
peaceful speech and assembly, which interferes with the functioning of
that particular institution. 178
Butte and Sacramento prisons, the defendants in Hrdlicka, are
within the category of places that are least shielded from speech
regulations. Jails can exclude speech that interferes with the functioning
of the prison. Since an influx of CJA will create security concerns within
the jails,179 prisons should be permitted to restrict it. Furthermore, as jails
174. Hrdlicka, 631 F.3d at 1046.
175. Id. at 1056 (Smith, J., dissenting) (citing United States v. Douglass, 579 F.2d
545, 549 (9th Cir. 1978)).
176. Douglass, 579 F.2d at 548; see generally LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 688-93 (1978); Harry Kalven Jr., The Concept of the Public
Forum: Cox v. Louisiana, 1965 SUP. CT. REV. 1.
177. Douglass, 579 F.2d at 549.
178. Id.
179. But see Hrdlicka, 631 F.3d at 1052 (holding jails failed to establish whether
distribution of CJA in the jails “would produce additional clutter in inmates [sic] cells or
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are not public fora, it should be within the prisons’ discretion as to
whether CJA should be allowed.
3. Deference to Prisons
The courts should be deferential to prison administrators and prison
regulations. “[B]ecause the ‘problems of prisons in America are complex
and intractable,’ and because courts are . . . ‘ill equipped’ to deal with
these problems, [the Supreme Court] generally ha[s] deferred to the
judgments of prison officials in upholding these regulations against
constitutional challenge.”180 “[U]nder Turner and its predecessors, prison
officials are to remain the primary arbiters of the problems that arise in
prison management.”181 In Shaw v. Murphy, the Supreme Court held that
“[s]eeking to avoid ‘unnecessarily perpetuat[ing] the involvement of the
federal courts in affairs of prison administration, [the Court] reject[s] an
alteration of the Turner analysis that would entail additional federalcourt oversight.”182 As such, the court should defer to decisions of prison
officials when deciding whether unsolicited copies of CJA can be
distributed.
By reversing summary judgment and disallowing prison officials to
uphold their regulations, the Ninth Circuit is violating the separation of
powers doctrine.
Prisons are creatures of the legislative and executive
branches [of government], . . . so deference should be
afforded [to the prisons] out of respect for the separation
of powers. Where state prisons are involved, federal
courts should defer for reasons of federalism. Or when
push comes to shove, managing prisons is simply not the
court’s job. 183

otherwise adversely affect jail security”).
180. Shaw v. Murphy, 532 U.S. 223, 229 (2001) (quoting Procunier v. Martinez,
416 U.S. 396, 404-05 (1974)).
181. Id. at 230 (citing Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987)).
182. Id. at 230-31 (quoting Turner, 482 U.S. at 89). “If courts were permitted to
enhance constitutional protection based on their assessments of the content of the
particular communications, courts would be in a position to assume a greater role in
decisions affecting prison administration.” Id.
183. Caplan, supra note 16, at 90-91 (footnotes omitted).
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Nonetheless, it is evident that prison administration should be left to
prisons and the officials who work there. As such, the regulations in
Butte and Sacramento jails disallowing the distribution of unsolicited
publications of CJA to inmates violates the separation of powers
doctrine, and the courts should defer to prison officials.
4. The Press Has No Constitutional Right to Access Prisons
The First Amendment prohibits the making of any law that abridges
the freedom of speech and infringes on the right of the press. 184 These
rights, however, are not absolute, and limitations exist. One such
limitation is the right of the press to access prison inmates.
It has generally been held that the First Amendment does
not guarantee the press a constitutional right of special
access to information not available to the public
generally. . . . [T]he press is regularly [denied access to]
grand jury proceedings, [court] conferences, [and] the
meetings of other official bodies gathering in executive
session . . . . [Furthermore, the press] ha[s] no
constitutional right of access to the scenes of crime or
disaster when the general public is excluded. 185
Thus, it is evident that the Constitution can limit such rights of the press,
and there is no constitutional duty to make available to journalists
sources of information not available to the members of the public
generally.
Just as the press has no special right of access to prisons, Hrdlicka
has no special right of access to demand that unsolicited publications of
CJA be distributed to inmates. As discussed earlier, a prison is not a
public forum. 186 Thus, a content neutral method for sheriffs to ensure
efficient administration of their facilities is allowed. Furthermore,
Hrdlicka has other avenues by which he can distribute CJA. 187 First, he
“can advertise . . . in . . . the jail in an effort to convince inmates . . . to

184. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
185. Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 833-34 (1974) (quoting Branzburg v. Hayes,
408 U.S. 665, 684-85 (1972)).
186. See supra text accompanying notes 175-79.
187. Hrdlicka v. Reniff, 631 F.3d 1044, 1057 (2011) (Smith, J., dissenting).
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request his publication.188 Second, if he advertises in the jail, it is likely
that prisoners will begin to discuss the magazine, and as a result, more
prisoners will become aware of the publication and also request it.
Although advertising is more costly than sending undistributed copies of
CJA to prisons, “in the context of prisons, losing ‘cost advantages does
not fundamentally implicate free speech values.’” 189 As such, Hrdlicka
cannot use the First Amendment to demand access to the prison inmates,
and even though that may be the most cost effective procedure for the
publication, cost advantages does not implicate free speech and press
values. 190
As discussed, the Turner test was the improper standard to apply to
the question of whether or not publishers have a First Amendment right
to distribute unsolicited copies of CJA to prison inmates. In Hrdlicka,
there were no prisoners’ claims regarding violations of their
constitutional rights. Therefore, the Turner test should not have been
applied. In addition, summary judgment should have been affirmed in
favor of the defendants. Since prisons are not public forums, there is no
constitutional right of access to prisoners, and courts should be
deferential to prison administrators and regulations.
D.

Test that Should Be Applied

Since the Turner test was the incorrect test to apply in Hrdlicka, a
different standard should be set forth. The test to decide whether a prison
regulation violates a publisher’s First Amendment rights should be: 1)
does the prison regulation serve an important government objective; and
2) is the regulation narrowly tailored? This is somewhat similar to the
time, place, and manner restrictions, which have been upheld by the
Supreme Court as constitutional restrictions on free speech. Since prisons
are not public fora, however, the test is more stringent and does not
include the “alternate channels of communication” and “content neutral”
prongs. Furthermore, the test does not include the “content neutral”
prong because it is necessary for prisons to censure certain topical
publications that are sent to prisoners. Such topics include descriptions of
how to build and use weapons, or how to escape from prisons.

188. Id.
189. Id. at 1057 (quoting Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners’ Labor Union, Inc., 433
U.S. 119, 130-31 (1977)).
190. See id.
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The aforementioned test includes only the two listed factors because
the courts should be deferential to prison administrators. As discussed
earlier, prisons are created and governed by the legislative and executive
branches.191 Courts should be deferential to their regulations. In addition,
prison administrators are familiar with the problems that arise in their
facilities, particularly the issues that exist when there are influxes of
paper and publications floating around prisons. Therefore, prison
officials should be the individuals who decide how best to regulate
inmates and prisons. The two-part test places some restrictions on the
amount of power such prison officials can exercise; the test, however,
does lean in favor of prison administrators.
Accordingly, courts should use the aforementioned test to determine
whether a prison regulation violates a publisher’s First Amendment
rights. If the test had been applied in Hrdlicka, the regulation would have
passed constitutional muster since the defendants stated several
important government objectives for disallowing unsolicited copies of
CJA to be distributed to inmates, and the regulation is narrowly tailored
to only disallow unsolicited copies of the publication to be distributed.
As such, summary judgment in favor of the prison defendants should
have been affirmed.
V.

Conclusion

“The constitutional guarantee of a free press ‘assures the
maintenance of our political system and an open society.’” 192
Furthermore, “the First and Fourteenth Amendments also protect the
right of the public to receive such information . . . as . . . published.” 193
While prisoners are still afforded constitutional rights such as the right to
receive information, they are not afforded the same liberties and
freedoms as other members of the public. As such, there are restrictions
on their constitutional rights. As evident in Thornburgh v. Abbott, one
such limitation is the right to receive certain publications. 194 If the
publications are deemed to be “detrimental to the security, good order, or
discipline of the institution or if it might facilitate criminal activity,” the

191. See supra text accompanying note 180-83.
192. Pell v. Procunier, 427 U.S. 817, 832 (1974) (quoting Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385
U.S. 374, 389 (1967)).
193. Id. (citing Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 762-63 (1972)).
194. 490 U.S. 401 (1989).
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warden may reject it.195 Another limitation imposed upon prisoners is
that a warden is permitted to reject publications that involve discussions
of certain topics such as descriptions as to how a person can “construct[]
or use . . . weapons, ammunition, [or] bombs.”196 The warden may also
censor publications that “depict[], encourage[] or [explain how to] escape
from [a] correctional facilit[y], or [if it] contains blueprints, drawings or
similar descriptions of” correctional facilities.197 Therefore, it is evident
that although prisoners still retain constitutional rights, those rights are
subject to restrictions.
In Hrdlicka v. Reniff, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals applied the
four-factor Turner test to determine whether publishers and inmates have
a First Amendment right to receive and distribute unsolicited copies of
CJA.198 The Turner test has been used in several previous cases to
determine whether prisoners’ constitutional rights were violated;
however, the Turner test, should not have been applied in Hrdlicka. The
Turner Court stated that their task was to “formulate a standard of review
for prisoners’ constitutional claims that is responsive both to the ‘policy
of judicial restraint regarding prisoner complaints and [to] the need to
protect constitutional rights.’” 199 The test refers to prisoners’ claims and
complaints, and the need to protect their rights. Since Hrdlicka brought
the claim on behalf of himself, the publisher, and CJA, the publication,
and there were no prisoners’ claims or complaints, the Turner test should
not have been applied.
In addition to the inapplicability of the Turner test, summary
judgment in favor of the defendants should have been affirmed. As
discussed earlier, prisons are not public fora, and thus are areas in which
the government can restrict and regulate speech-related conduct. The
distribution of CJA is one such example of speech-related conduct that
the government should be able to regulate. Also, since prisons problems
are often “complex and intractable,” courts should be deferential to
prison administrators since they are the ones familiar and experienced
with the intricacies of such issues and how best to deal with them. 200

195. Id. at 403 n.5 (quoting 28 C.F.R. § 540.71(b) (2012)).
196. 28 C.F.R. § 540.71(b)(1).
197. Id. § 540.71(b)(2).
198. 631 F.3d 1044, 1049-50 (9th Cir. 2011).
199. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 85 (1987) (emphasis added) (quoting Procunier
v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 406 (1974)).
200. Shaw v. Murphy, 532 U.S. 223, 229 (2001) (quoting Procunier v. Martinez,
416 U.S. 396, 404-05 (1974)).
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Furthermore, since prisons are creatures of the legislative and executive
branches of the government, the courts should respect the separation of
powers and afford even more deference to prisons. Finally, the press
does not have a constitutional right to access prisons. Although the First
Amendment affords freedom to the press, there are restrictions, and one
such limitation is access to prison inmates. Accordingly, the prison
defendants in Hrdlicka should be awarded the right to regulate their
prisons in the manner they wish, and the Ninth Circuit should have been
deferential to prison policies.
The test to determine whether a publisher’s First Amendment rights
are violated by a prison regulation should be a two-part test: 1) does the
regulation serve an important government objective; and 2) is the
regulation narrowly tailored. The test should be limited to these two
prongs because regulating a prison is a difficult job and one in which
involves intricacies and complexities. Therefore, the courts should be
deferential to prison administrators, and the test should reflect this
deferential attitude. If the courts were to apply the aforementioned test,
summary judgment should have been affirmed, as the prison stated
several reasons for the regulation, such as security concerns, and the
regulation is narrowly tailored as it only referred to unsolicited copies of
the publication. Regardless of the test, however, Hrdlicka should not be
allowed to distribute unsolicited copies of CJA to prison inmates, and
summary judgment should have been affirmed.
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